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Why do I need Sakundi's solutions?

Blockchain security is becoming increasingly relevant in today’s cyberspace as it extends its influence in many industries. Sakundi focuses on protecting the different layers of the blockchain.

Initally we focus on the lowest level layer, the P2P network that allows the nodes to communicate and share information. The P2P network layer may be vulnerable to several families of attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), eclipse attacks, or Sybil attacks. This layer is prone to threats inherited from traditional P2P networks, and it must be analyzed and understood by collecting data and extracting insights from the network behavior to reduce those risks. Validator, beacons and execution nodes in Ethereum are the pieces of softwre most exposed to those risks. They constantly interact with other peers using Internet forming the peer-to-peer network.

Even though blockchain technology can be highly secure and decentralized, it still offers attack opportunities. For example, in blockchain networks, there are cases, such as the ones mentioned in [8, 20, 26, 27], in which the dApps, average users, or the network itself are exposed to risks due to particular vulnerabilities [4, 8, 20, 21, 24, 26, 40, 42, 43]. Therefore, understanding the risks associated with blockchain networks and effectively developing security-focused solutions is essential to any blockchain.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are decentralized networks that include many nodes storing and distributing data collectively, and each node operates as an individual peer. The communication is carried out without a central authority; hence, all nodes obtain the same amount of power and are responsible for the same activities. The P2P network is one of the fundamental components of the blockchains that enable the creation and operation of cryptocurrencies [28].

In the blockchain, the P2P network enables nodes to exchange data, for instance, transactions and blocks. In general, there is an economic incentive for participants to behave honestly. Given their public and distributed nature, blockchain components are especially exposed to attackers who can easily reach and interact with the different layers. Such adversaries may use a malicious node, tool, or software to take advantage of specific weaknesses in the P2P network layer and launch several attacks on the blockchain, like the ones described in [20, 26, 43]. The security of the entire blockchain relies on the reliability of its P2P network.

The Ethereum P2P protocol [36] was influenced by the kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) design. Although kademlia possesses valuable properties, it has several limitations in terms of its security [4, 22]. There are several known attacks for such a protocol, including the eclipse attacks [20, 43], where it is possible to perform manipulations against the Ethereum P2P network participants, and deanonymization attacks, as presented in [14]. Nevertheless, employing multiple detection and mitigation approaches [10, 11] can significantly reduce or eliminate the severity of these risks.

We provide a monitoring solution for Ethereum nodes, focusing on cybersecurity issues. Users who utilize Sakundi for Nodes will receive insights and alerts related to the status of their clients. Anomalous incidents are detected so users can take action to avoid any service interruption. In the following sections, we explain how users can employ our tool.

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